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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The magistrate court exceeded the scope of its jurisdictional authority in its decision to 
set aside the 2012 Transfers. The magistrate court compounded this error in its erroneous 
application of the law to its determination that the February 14, 1990 Will of Victoria was the 
result of undue influence by Vernon. 
Joseph concedes that Vernon's recitation of the facts, while "unduly prolix," "contains no 
glaring factual inaccuracies." Respondent' s Brief ("R. Brief'), p. 2. The same does not apply to 
the facts averred by Joseph, many of which ( 1) Jack any evidentiary support (2) are taken out of 
context, or (3) rely upon inadmissible hearsay. Attached hereto as Addendum I is a summary of 
statements made by Joseph, a citation to the record upon which Joseph relied, and a separate line 
for context or comment. This summary is not exhaustive and is intended to illustrate the fallacy 
of many of the arguments advanced by Joseph. In addition to factual inaccuracies, Joseph fails 
to apply well-settled Idaho Jaw upon the elements of a claim of undue influence in his repeated 
reliance upon events far removed from the execution of the Will. 
Recognizing the appellate standard of review, and with due deference to the magistrate 
court, Vernon submits that this case presents the unusual scenario wherein the court's findings of 
fact and conclusions of law should be vacated upon a lack of substantial or competent evidence. 
In summary, the following findings are erroneous: 
1. The magistrate court erred as a matter of law and fact when it overrode the intent 
of Victoria H. Smith and set aside her Will without competent evidence of undue 
influence. 
2. The magistrate erred in its sua spollte application of the presumption of undue 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
influence without evidence of a nexus between the execution of the Will and a 
fiduciary duty. 
3. Even if the presumption did apply, the magistrate court nevertheless erred in its 
determination that Vernon failed to rebut the presumption. The magistrate court's 
error consisted of allowing inadmissible testimony and making clearly erroneous 
findings with regard to material facts. 
4. Idaho law is clear that the existence of undue influence must be established as of 
the date of the creacion of the Will. The magistrate court erred as a· matter of law 
in its consideration of events far removed from the execution of the Will as a 
substitute for evidence of any undue influence operating at the time the Will was 
executed. 
5. The court erred as a matter of law when it exceeded its jurisdiction to enter 
summary judgment in favor of Joseph upon the 2012 Transfers. Joseph's Brief is 
demonstrably silent upon the court's lack of jurisdiction because, as even Joseph 
must concede, VHS Properties, LLC, the present owner of the real properties at 
issue, was deprived of due process by these proceedings. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. THE WILL CLEARLY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY EXPRESSED THE INTENT OF 
VICTORIA H. SMITH FOR THE DEVOLUTION OF HER PROPERTY. 
Joseph does not dispute that the Will complied with all of the formalities required by 
Idaho Code § 15-2-503. The Will was handwritten by Victoria, specifically stated that it was a 
"holographic will," and disposed of the entirety of Victoria's estate. Joseph also concedes that 
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Victoria had full testamentary capacity when she executed her Will. TT. p. 153, I. 7 - p. 154, I. 
18. Thus, Joseph acknowledges that Victoria was of sound mind and that she had "sufficient 
strength and clearness of mind and memory, to know, in general, without prompting, the nature 
and extent of the property of which [she] is about to dispose, and nature of the act which [she] is 
about to perform, and the names and identity of persons who are to be the objects of [her] 
bounty, and [her] relation towards them." /11 re Estate of Conway, 152 Idaho 933, 943-44, 277 
P .3d 380, 390-91 (2012). 
Rather than controvert Vernon's statement of facts illustrating Victoria's independence or 
intellectual capacity, Joseph complains that Victoria's choice to execute a holographic will was 
ill-advised. Joseph's argument is advanced in a vacuum with no reference to the Will at issue. 
Victoria's holographic Will was remarkably similar to her late husband's holographic will and 
disposed of almost exactly the same real property. Joseph's current reliance upon the value of 
the real property making the disposition of the same by a holographic will improvident was 
equally applicable to Vernon Sr.'s own holographic will. Vernon Sr. was a well-respected 
attorney who chose to utilize a holographic will (Ex. 200); that his wife would elect to follow in 
his footsteps is not suspicious or otherwise susceptible to attack merely because Joseph claims, 
without citation to authority, that Victoria's election to handwrite her own Will should be 
eschewed. See R. Brief, p. 27; See also p. 33 (citing Vernon's failure to counsel Victoria to seek 
estate planning advice because the estate was worth $20,000,000.00 as evidence of Vernon's 
"disposition"). 1 
1 This argument also assumes, without evidence, that estate planning advice would have impacted Victoria's intent 
for the disposition of Victoria's estate. 
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Joseph's reliance upon the intent of the legislature to "provide individuals with a 
testamentary option where a terminal illness or exigent circumstances prevented access to 
counsel and the drafting of a conventional, printed will" is made without citation to any 
authority. R. Brief, p. 27. The reliance upon the testimony of Lyman Belnap to support this 
proposition is misplaced. Mr. Belnap's testimony was limited to a generalized comment upon 
the circumstances in which he has personally recommended use of a holographic will with no 
reference to the holographic will at issue in thi~ case. TT. at p. 224, I. 19 - p. 225, I. 23. 
Victoria's Will was a handwritten and signed statement of her intention for the 
disposition of her estate. Idaho law has long recognized that a testator has the right to dispose of 
her property as she chooses. Mollendorf v. Derry, 95 Idaho I, 3, 50 I P.2d 199,201 (1972) (citing 
Tumer v. Gumbert, 19 Idaho 339, 114, p. 33 (1911), among other cases). The mere influence of 
affection and attachment, or the mere desire to reward a party for years of service or support will 
not vitiate a testamentary act unless the act was the result of coercion or importunity beyond the 
testator's power to resist. Gmeiner v. Yacte, 100 Idaho 1, 7, 592 P.2d 57, 63 (1979); Mollendorf. 
95 Idaho at 5, 501 P.3d at 203. Herein, as developed more fully below, there was no evidence 
that Victoria's free agency was destroyed by Vernon on February 14, 1990. See Ill re lunders' 
Estate, 74 Idaho 448, 454-55, 263 P.2d 1002, 1006-07 (1953) (citations omitted) (defining undue 
influence as "domination by the guilty party over the testator to such an extent that his free 
agency is destroyed and the will of another person substituted for that of the testator."). 
B. JOSEPH'S "STATEMENT OF FACTS" IS REPLETE WITH ERRONEOUS LEGAL 
CONCLUSIONS AND IS NOT AN ACCURATE REFLECTION OF THE EVIDENCE. 
Under a heading titled "Statement of Facts," Joseph identifies several key findings made 
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by the magistrate court, together with a reference to the evidence Joseph contends supports the 
court's findings. As illustrated more fully in Addendum l, Joseph's citations to the evidentiary 
record are incomplete and inaccurate. 
1. The magistrate court's finding that Vernon was not credible is not 
supported by competent evidence. 
Vernon recognizes that the magistrate court is in the best position to evaluate the 
credibility of witnesses appearing before it. Nevertheless, Vernon submits that the trial court's 
determination upon his lack of credibility was not supported by competent evidence.2 As Joseph 
notes, the magistrate court found that three events were indicia of Vernon's lack of credibility: 
(I) the "shady" Raymond Street Purchase and Vernon's request that the IRS perform an audit~ 
(2) the 2008 POA and the 2012 Transfers; and (3) Vernon's testimony regarding Joseph's 
knowledge of the Will. R. Brief, p. 6-7. 
As briefed in the Appellant's Opening Brief at p. 31, the magistrate court's alleged 
knowledge of standard IRS audit procedures finds no support in any evidence adduced at trial. 
Joseph offers no citation to evidence or authority to the contrary. Upon the issue of the 
Raymond foreclosure sale, the magistrate court's conclusion that "this evidence that Vernon is 
willing to engage in 'shady' or blatantly dishonest behavior to accomplish his ends and to 
potentially commit a fraud on the court and on his ex-wife supports the Court's credibility 
determination" is erroneous. R 1574. Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b), provides that 
"[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person 
to show action in conformity therewith." See also Thom Springs Ranch, Inc. v. Smith, 137 Idaho 
2 Notwithstanding the magistrale court's determination that Vernon lacked credibility, the court and Joseph 
selectively rely upon the testimony of Vernon 10 support material lindings. 
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480, 486, 50 P.3d 975, 981 (2002) (applying Rule 404(b) in a civil proceeding). R 1574. As 
briefed previously, the circumstances surrounding the Raymond foreclosure were not in dispute: 
Vernon does not deny that he asked his brother to bid on the home; he does not deny that he did 
not want his wife to claim an interest in the home; and he did not deny that called Joseph 
disloyal. Joseph did not dispute that Victoria volunteered to purchase the home. Simply put, 
there was no contrary testimony offered by Joseph upon which a credibility determination was 
necessary. Rather, the magistrate court relies upon this event as pure propensity evidence to 
conclude that, in her opinion, Vernon's conduct was "shady" and evidenced a willingness to 
commit fraud. The court's reliance upon its "credibility'' determination as a substitute for 
evidence of undue influence in or around February 14, 1990 is prohibited by Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 404(b). 
Similarly, Joseph's claim that in 2012 Vernon "abused" the 2008 POA which "supports 
the Magistrate's finding that Vernon was not a credible witness and possessed the disposition to 
engage in undue influence" is not based upon any evidence presented at trial. See R. Brief, p. 7. 
This same argument is repeated on page 8 and 9 of Joseph's brief. Vernon did not deny that he 
relied upon the 2008 POA to transfer real and personal property in 2012 which actions he stated 
were consistent with the desires of Victoria. There was no evidence to the contrary. As with the 
Raymond foreclosure, there was no dispute in the evidentiary record that Vernon relied upon the 
2008 POA to transfer Victoria's property to VHS Properties, LLC, in 2012. Vernon asserted that 
the 2008 POA empowered him to make this transfer; the court ruled that, as a matter of law, the 
2008 POA did not. The magistrate court's inclusion of this issue as evidence of "credibility" 
ignores that there was no conflicting testimony upon which a credibility determination was 
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necessary. The magistrate court erred in holding that the 2012 Transfers establish that Vernon 
was not "credible" and the subsequent and repeated reliance upon the 2012 Transfers for nearly 
every element of the undue influence claim as evidence of Vernon's propensity or "disposition" 
to unduly influence Victoria was inconsistent with Rule 404(b), Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
Moreover, the 2012 Transfers were more than twenty years removed from the execution of the 
Will and were not relevant to any fact in dispute with respect to the February 14, 1990, Will. 
I.R.E. 401, 402; Swaringen v. Swanstrom, 67 Idaho 245, 247-48, 175 P.2d 692, 693 (1946) 
(citation omitted) (holding that "in a contest on the ground of undue influence, it must be shown 
that such undue influence existed and was operating at the time of the execution of the will.). 
Finally, in defense of the magistrate court's conclusion that Vernon lacked credibility 
because the court did not believe Vernon's claim that Joseph knew about the Will, Joseph cites 
to his own self-serving testimony upon the topic. R. Brief, p. 7. Both the court and Joseph 
ignore the tellers Joseph sent to his mother that suggest, if not expressly admit, that Joseph was 
aware of his mother' s intention to disinherit him. See e.g. Exs. 224 ("Sharon and I felt staying 
out of your life was your desire. You have never told me to stay out of your life in actual words . 
. . . Since I was about IO years old, I thought I as a part of my father and mothers scenario. I 
realize of now you have the power and control to null and void my roots."); See also Exs. 231, 
234. 
In sum, the magistrate court's determination that Vernon was not a credible witness was 
erroneous. This predicate finding to the magistrate court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law ("FFCL") sets the tone for the remainder of the magistrate court's result-driven findings. 
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2. The court's conclusion that Vernon provided his mother with legal 
advice in the preparation of her Will does not find support in the 
record. 
In support of the proposition that Vernon provided Victoria with legal advice in the 
preparation of her Will, Joseph merely cites to a block-quote from the magistrate court's FFCL. 
R. Brief, p. 7-8; see also Addendum I. Rather than identify portions of the record that support 
the magistrate's findings, Joseph cites to the portion of the trial transcript wherein Vernon 
testified that he did not discuss with his mother whether to consult an estate planning 
professional.3 Id. Joseph provides no substantive response to Appellant's recitation of the facts 
evidencing Victoria's sophistication or intelligence; nor does he identify any authority to support 
the proposition that the terms utilized by Victoria in drafting her Will had "special legal gloss" or 
were beyond the comprehension of a lay person, let alone Victoria. The magistrate court's 
finding that Victoria was intellectually incapable of drafting her Will lacked competent or 
substantial evidence and should be reversed. 
3. The magistrate court erred in finding that there was any evidence of 
susceptibility. 
In support of the magistrate court's conclusion that Victoria was susceptible to Vernon's 
influence, Joseph restates the magistrate's findings that "in 1990 Vernon persuaded his mother to 
bid at a foreclosure"; "Between August 1989 and March 1990, Mrs. Smith gave Vernon over 
$40,000.00"; and "Mrs. Smith was making Vernon ' s child support payments and paying his 
3 Although omitted by Joseph's ci1a1ion 10 lhe 1ranscrip1, Vernon previously stated: .. Because my mother didn ' l ask 
for it. She wanted to do a holographic will." TT p. :ns. I. 25 - p. 229, I. I. Vernon also tcs1ilied .. My mother owned 
al11he property. She was 1he sole heir of my father's holographic will. And she did not want any other involvement 
in any estate planning. She knew what she was going to do and she did what she did." IT p. 342. II. I 5- I 9. 
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office expenses." As previously briefed, these findings do not find support in the evidence. 
With respect to the Raymond Street foreclosure sale, it was undisputed that during a 
conversation between Joseph, Vernon, and Victoria, Joseph refused to bid on the Raymond 
property and Victoria volunteered to do so. TT. p. 236, L 9-25~ see also p. 162, I. 11 - p. 164, I. 
21. Cf. Gmeiner, 100 Idaho at 5, 592 P.2d at 61: 
It follows from the very nature of the thing that evidence to show undue influence must 
be largely, in effect, circumstantial. It is an intangible thing, which only in the rarest 
instances is susceptible of what may be termed direct or positive proof. The difficulty is 
also enhanced by the fact, universally recognized, that he who seeks to use undue 
influence does so in privacy. He seldom uses brute force or open threats to terrorize his 
intended victim, and if he does he is careful that no witnesses are about to take note of 
and testify to the fact. He observes, too, the same precautions if he seeks by cajolery, 
flattery, or other methods to obtain power and control over the will of another, and direct 
it improperly to the accomplishment of the purpose which he desires ... 
The reliance upon a group conversation, the totality of which can be summarized as 
Joseph saying "no," Vernon calling Joseph "disloyal," and Victoria volunteering to purchase the 
home, as evidence of susceptibility or disposition is, in a word, meritless. Joseph did not testify 
that Vernon pressured, persuaded, or otherwise overbore the will of his mother. Rather, Joseph 
simply stated that Vernon called him "disloyal" "and that is where it all started." TT p. 162, I. 13 
- p. 164, I. 16. 
The court's reliance upon gifts to Vernon is also misplaced. The evidence established a 
long and continuing pattern of gifts and loans by Victoria to each of her children, and especially 
Joseph and Vernon. See e.g. Exs. 202,203,204,205,206,207,210, 21 l, 213,215. 
Upon the topic of child support, Joseph selectively relies upon the 1991 Affidavit of 
Victoria wherein she states: 
To date I have loaned all funds to my son to pay any child or spousal support because of 
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Sharon's theft of all office receipts, the IRS seizures, uncollectible nature of his accounts 
and the financial complications he is experiencing. I am reluctant to loan more funds 
without absolute security or assignment of assets. 
Ex. 269, p. 6-7. 
The passage in the 1991 Affidavit cited by Joseph is preceded by Victoria's statement: 
Affiant owns all of those real property assets. and I intend to live a very long time. I 
retain the right to terminate the use of any building at any time. and may elect to sell any 
of my property at any time I should choose. No one tells me who will inherit my 
property. 
Id. Joseph's selective reliance upon the 1991 Affidavit to establish that Victoria was paying 
Vernon's child support, to the exclusion of Victoria's statement "[n]o one tells me who will 
inherit my property" is consistent with the result-driven analysis that plagued the court's FFCL. 
Joseph asks this Court to ignore direct evidence of Victoria's lack of susceptibility because, in 
his words, "the affidavit tends to support the existence of susceptibility." R. Brief, p. 32 
(emphasis added). The support Joseph identifies for this argument is a claim that (I) the 
affidavit was signed at the request of Vernon or his attorney; (2) Victoria's willingness to lend 
Vernon $10,000.00 in response to his request indicates susceptibility; (3) Victoria's statement 
that she permitted Vernon to use her property is evidence of susceptibility; and, (4) Victoria's 
loans to Vernon. These arguments contain inferences that cannot reasonably be drawn from the 
Affidavit. First, Bry Behrmann is the attorney listed on the first page of the Affidavit. Ex. 269. 
There is no reference to Bry Behrmann being Vernon's attorney; nor does the Affidavit state that 
it was prepared at Vernon's request. Id. The conclusion that Vernon procured this Affidavit is 
simply not supported by any fact in evidence. The reliance upon loans to Vernon is likewise 
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inapposite.4 During the same time frame, Victoria made considerable gifts or loans to Joseph. 
See e.g. Exs. 202, 203, 204, 205, 210, 211, 213, 215. Finally, the claim that Victoria's 
permissive use of her property is evidence of "susceptibility" ignores that Victoria specifically 
stated: 
He was to pay for any improvements made, and he was to receive the benefits of 
deductions available through the tax considerations of those costs as he had all rights to 
use it, subject to my right to terminate whenever I should desire .... I retain the ri2ht to 
terminate the use of any building at any time. and may elect to sell any of my property at 
any time I should choose. No one tells me who will inherit my property. 
Ex. 269; see also TI p. 142, I. 8 - p. 143, I. 10; (Ms. Puckett: "she was very set in her ways. If 
she wanted something done it was done. I saw her chew [Vernon] out on various occasions and 
he would just say yes, mother. Yes, mother. Because he knew better than to argue with her 
opinion and what she wanted done.") p. 144, II. 10-17. (Ms. Puckett: "She acted as her own 
woman. She was very stubborn and set in her ways, and she was very intelligent."). 
Joseph's contention that Exhibit 269 document supplies evidence to support the 
magistrate court's determination of susceptibility is, like the magistrate court's finding itself, 
erroneous. 
4. The magistrate court erred as a matter of law and abused its 
discretion in its adoption of Joseph's theory of isolation and 
estrangement. 
According to Joseph, he and his family continued to enjoy a close relationship with 
Victoria as of February 1990. See e.g., TT. p. 153, I. 7 - p. 154, I. 18. Joseph initially claimed 
that he had a good relationship with Victoria until 1992 and that in 1992 things changed. TT. p. 
~ Joseph's reliance upon Exhibit 65 lO support 1his argument lacks support. Exhibit 65 was admilled for illuslrativc 
purposes only; il is nol ilsclf evidence and the reliance lhercon is misplaced. 
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73, I. 25 - p. 74, I. 4. Into 1992, Joseph and his family were still actively engaged in providing 
transportation support to Victoria. At trial, Joseph initially conceded that the breakdown in his 
relationship with Victoria occurred in 1992 and later offered that the breakdown started as early 
as June 1990. See IT p. 97, I. 5 - p. 98, I. 2; p. 158, I. 3 - p. 164, I. 16; p. 164, I. 22 - p. 167, I. 
21. 
Joseph blamed Vernon for the break-down in his [Joseph's] relationship with Victoria. In 
the nearly two decades that preceded the trial, however, Joseph consistently took the position that 
Victoria's feelings and decisions were her own: 
As I have said in earlier correspondence, you have the power to thrust me and my family 
out of the scenario I helped to build. I have spent the last two years trying to accept the 
dispowerment of your wishes. That has been one of the largest assignments I have 
obligated to master. The second and equally difficult assignment I have had trouble 
mastering is accepting that you like me close to nothing. 
Ex 231 (emphasis added). 
In the last 30 to 49 days, we have talked on the phone once and in person three or four 
times .... You have jabbed and poked at me on each occasion when we were speaking in 
person. You are a war pony and a very talented one in that capacity. You are a little 
Rocky Marciano (maybe that is even a compliment. I am a peaceful person. You are not. 
You have an uncontrollable desire and need to fight. ... You cannot get past the dresser 
syndrome .... Your choice is your choice. I hope you are happy with your choices. They 
look lonely to me. 
Ex 238 (emphasis added). Joseph himself conceded that the relationship broke down over a 
business dispute. Ex. 219; TT. p. 98, I. 3 - p. 100, I. 4.5 Victoria "fired" Joseph from his 
5 In chis regard, the magistrate court's finding that "beginning in late I 991, Vernon persuaded his mother to reject 
Joseph's management decisions'' is erroneous. Thi! magistrate court cites Exhibits 219 and 220 to support this 
claim. Those exhibits arc lcuers drar1ed by Joseph wherein he notifies a third party that Victoria has selected 
Vernon to manage a lease. There was no evidence of "persuasion," or pressure upon Victoria. Joseph himself 
conceded that with respect to the fence repairs, Joseph convinced Victoria to accept repairs that he found to be 
"close to satisfactory·• "nol first class work." TI. p. 160. I. 8-p. 162, I. 2. Joseph reported that Vernon disagreed 
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position as a manager in 1992. TT p. 160, I. 8 - p. 162, I. 2. Joseph's hurt feelings over 
Victoria's decision are repeatedly expressed m his letters. See e.g. Exs. 231, 234, 238. The 
letters do not support Joseph's present claim that Vernon engaged in a pattern of conduct which 
isolated or alienated Joseph from Victoria's life. 
The magistrate court's conclusion that Vernon engineered the breakdown in the 
relationship between Joseph and his family ignored substantial and competent evidence to the 
contrary and, in any event, was expressly related to a time period two-years removed from the 
execution of the Will. The court itself concluded "[i]n early fall 1992, over two years after 
Victoria executed her holographic will, something drastic happened to the relationship between 
his mother and Joseph and his family." R. 1585. 
As previously cited, it is well-established Idaho law that "in a contest on the ground 
of undue influence, it must be shown that such undue influence existed and was operating at the 
rime of the execlllio11 of the will." Swaringen v. Swanstrom, 67 Idaho 245, 247-48, 175 P.2d 692, 
693 ( 1946) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). There was no evidence of alienation or 
isolation in February 1990 and the trial court erred as a matter of law and fact in relying upon 
events occurring in 1992 and beyond to support a finding that Victoria's Will was the product of 
undue influence by Vernon. 
with Joseph's recommendation to accept the repairs and Victoria ultimately removed Joseph from his position as 
manager after Joseph refused to tell the tenant to lix the repairs. Id. Joseph's recitation of Victoria's agreement and 
subsequent rejection of his proposed course of action was hearsay, subject to a timely objection. which objection 
was overruled in so far as the court permiued the testimony for the limited purpose of Victoria's "state of mind." 
Moreover, the fact thal Victoria changed her mind is not evidence of pressure or persuasion and is readily explained 
as a business decision to reject sub-par repairs. Joseph was fired after he refused Victoria's request 10 tell the tenant 
to re-do a portion of his work. CJ., TT p. 142, II. 10-15 (Ms. Puckett "I saw her chew LVernon] out on various 
occasions and he would just say yes, mother. Yes, mother. Because he knew bencr than lo argue with her opinion 
and what she wan1ed done.") 
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5. The magistrate court's reliance upon a lack of evidence regarding 
Converse was erroneous. 
It was undisputed that Converse did not appear for her mother's funeral; nor did she join 
in Joseph's Petition to set aside the Will. She did, however, send a long email to her brothers 
explaining her choices, Exhibit 257, which letter was erroneously refused into evidence.6 In 
addition, the evidence was undisputed that Victoria did not maintain a relationship with her 
daughter, Converse, before or after the Will was executed. See e.g., TT p. 315, I. 2-11 
(identifying argumen~s in and around 1985/1986). Converse resides in Oregon and has lived 
there since at least 1974. See R 46 at 16; TT p. 486, II. 20-23. Joseph himself acknowledged, 
only after being impeached, that in 1991, that Converse and Victoria "had enough of a 
conversation that [Converse] left and never came back." TT. p. 49, I. 17 - p. 50, I. 21. Although 
the court was critical of a lack of estrangement in 1990, the record was discernably silent upon 
any evidence of a loving or close relationship between Converse and Victoria in 1990, or ever 
for that matter. 
6. The magistrate court's reliance upon the testimony of Father Faucher 
was not consistent with Idaho law. 
Joseph's final "Statement of Fact" recites that the magistrate court correctly relied upon 
6 See AppcllanL's Opening Brief, p. 43-44. Joseph responded to Vernon's argumcnl by simply repeating the 
magistraic coun's conclusion for the proposition that this document was not "relevant." Questions of relevance arc 
reviewed de novo. Exhibit 257 contains repealed assertions by Converse that she and her mother had no relationship 
-ever. The magistrate court made material findings that Vernon failed to establish a rational justification for 
Victoria to disinherit Converse. Converse herself readily supplies this justification and. while her writing was 20 
years removed, it expressed decades worth of hurl feelings over the fact that "THERE HAD NEVER BEEN A 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MOTHER AND ME." Ex 257. Converse continues "AS A CHILD AND 
TEENAGER. I OFTEN WISHED AND HOPED THAT DADDY WOULD DIVORCE MOTHER AND 
REMARRY. I FIGURED THAT WAY l'D HA VE A 50/50 CHANCE OF HAVING A STEPMOTHER LIKING 
ME AND BEING NICE TO ME BECAUSE MY OWN MOTHER TREATED ME LIKE A STEP DAUGHTER 
ANYWAY." Ex 257. The magistrate court erred in its decree that this document was not relevant which error 
resulted insignificant prejudice to Vernon. 
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the testimony of Father Faucher to establish that Victoria was susceptible to Vernon's influence. 
The reliance upon Father Faucher's testimony, taken out of context, and relating to an event or 
events nearly two decades removed from the execution of the Will, does not support Joseph's 
premise and is inconsistent with Idaho Jaw. Swaringen, 67 Idaho at 247-48, 175 P.2d 693. 
Father Faucher testified that Victoria was open to giving a gift, which testimony was the subject 
of an objection for hearsay. The court failed to apply well settled-Idaho Jaw in its decision to 
overrule a timely objection to the testimony of Father Faucher. In re Conway, 152 Idaho at 941, 
277 P.3d at 388 (holding that statements of a decedent are typically inadmissible unless they 
pertain to her mental condition "to prove his inability to resist the influence of others" rather than 
to prove the truth of those statements .. . provided they are not too remote to throw light upon the 
mental condition of the testator at the time of the execution of the will."). See also Section F, 
below. 
The court erroneously permitted Father Faucher to testify to conversations with the 
decedent, or with other unnamed people, nearly twenty years removed from Victoria' s execution 
of her Will. Joseph and the court both relied upon this hearsay testimony to conclude that 
Victoria wanted to give a sizeable gift to the church and that Vernon prevented her from doing 
so. Father Faucher's testimony is neither competent nor substantial evidence of "susceptibility" 
to Vernon and the court erred in its failure to apply Idaho Jaw to refused its admission. 
Moreover, the reliance upon Father Faucher for the proposition that Victoria "had a deep 
appreciation for strong men" and "had a desire to please" such figures, is specious. R. Brief, p. 
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11.7 (citing TT p. 420, I. 18 - p. 421, I. 2). Thus, Joseph argues, Victoria was susceptible to 
Vernon's influence. The recitation of Father Faucher's testimony is incomplete in material 
respects and is taken out of context. Notably, Father Faucher specifically listed the persons in 
whom he felt Victoria reposed a deep appreciation - all of which were men of the church. TT. p. 
p. 420, L 18 - p. 421, I. 2. It was uncontested that Victoria was devoutly Catholic; that she 
would have an elevated level of respect for her pastor and other men of the church does not 
establish a unique susceptibility to Vernon. The magistrate court's finding that Vernon "is a 
formidable and persuasive man" is inapposite. 
C. THE MAGISTRATE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN ITS APPLICATION OF 
THE PRESUMPTION OF UNDUE INFLUENCE. 
Conclusions of Jaw are freely reviewed. In re Estate of McKee, 153 Idaho 432, 436, 283 
P.3d 749, 753 (2012). The court's determination upon factual issues must be set aside if not 
supported by substantial, competent evidence. Green 11. Green, 161 Idaho 675, 681, 389 P .3d 
961, 967 (2017). Similarly, decisions regarding the admission of evidence at trial are reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard. See Mac Tools, Inc. v. Griffin, 126 Idaho 193, 199, 879 
P.2d 1126, l 132 (1994). However, "the question of relevancy under I.R.E. 402 is not a 
discretionary matter because there is no issue of credibility or finding of fact for the trial court to 
resolve prior to deciding whether to admit the evidence." Id. "Thus, this Court reviews the trial 
court's relevancy decisions under the de novo standard of review." Id. 
The court's decision to apply the presumption of undue influence was made .ma sponte, 
prior to trial. See generally, Tr. p. 187, I. 19-p. 188, I. 8. In a hearing two-months prior, the 
7This same argument and citation is found at p. 23, R. Brief, as well. 
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magistrate court cautioned Vernon "You have an uphill battle" while at the same time denying 
his request for a continuance so that he could secure counsel. Tr. p. 102, II. 5-13. The trend 
continued with the evidentiary rulings at trial and with the first two pages of "findings" in the 
court's decision dedicated to the court's perception of Vernon's "shady" dealings as evidence of 
a lack of "credibility." For Vernon, the uphill battle was lost long before it started. 
1. There is no evidence of a nexus between Vernon's role as Victoria's 
attorney and Victoria's preparation of her Will. 
As Joseph recognizes, in order to apply the presumption, two conditions must exist: ( l) 
a fiduciary relationship between the testator and the beneficiary, and (2) the beneficiary must 
have had some role in the preparation of the Will. Wooden v. Martin ( In re Conway), 152 Idaho 
933, 938-39, 277 P.3d 380, 385-86 (2012); Green v. Green, 161 Idaho 675,681,389 P.3d 961, 
967 (2017). The magistrate court's decision to apply the presumption was announced during a 
hearing held October 14, 2016, upon the court's finding that "based upon the information set 
forth in the pleadings by Mr. V .K. Smith himself, there is a rebuttable presumption that the 1990 
holographic will was the result of Vernon K. Smith , Jr's undue influence, since his own 
pleadings provide a basis for ruling that he was the sole beneficiary." Tr. p. 192, 11. 11-18. The 
magistrate court's pretrial decision hinged upon the existence of a fiduciary relationship but 
failed to take into account the required nexus between the fiduciary duty and the preparation of 
the Will. Joseph's current reliance upon trial testimony regarding advice for the safekeeping of 
the Will to establish a nexus ignores that the court's ruling upon the application of the 
presumption of undue influence occurred prior to trial. 
Similarly, Joseph's citation to other incidents he claims are evidence of "legal advice" 
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from Vernon to his mother to support the magistrate court's imposition of the presumption of 
undue influence is both factually inaccurate and irrelevant. See R. Brief, p. 22; Addendum I, 
Item 15. The attempt to blend these purported instances of "legal advice" with the court's 
application of the presumption of undue influence does not present a cogent argument to support 
the court's decision. 
2. Joseph's effort to distinguish this case from Swaringen from the case at 
bar falls flat. 
In support of the argument that Swaringen is distinguishable, Joseph cites the testimony 
of Father Faucher that Victoria "had a deep appreciation for strong men" and "had a desire to 
please" such figures. R. Brief, p. 23 ( citing TT p. 420, I. 18 - p. 42 l, I. 2). See Section B.6., 
above. Joseph further attempts to distinguish Swaringen upon the ground that the 
beneficiary/attorney in Swaringen did not participate in the preparation of the Will and the 
testator had the benefit of independent legal advice in the drafting of the Will. For the reasons 
previously discussed, there was no evidence that Vernon participated in the preparation of the 
Will. Upon Joseph's last point, that the testator in Swaringen was "strong-minded" and not 
susceptible to being influenced, it was undisputed, and the court reluctantly conceded, that 
Victoria was, generally speaking, strong willed. R. 1594. 
The attempt to distinguish Green is likewise inapposite. Green was cited for the 
proposition that Idaho law requires proof of a nexus between the fiduciary duty and the act of 
preparing a will. Therein, the Supreme Court held that the mere existence of a fiduciary 
relationship was not sufficient to trigger a presumption of undue influence. 161 Idaho at 681, 389 
P.3d at 967. Instead, the burden was on the contestant to "show some nexus between the 
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fiduciary relationship and the execution of the donative instrument." Id; see also Swaringen, 61 
Idaho at 248, 175 P.2d al 695. 
Under Green and its progeny, the magistrate erred as a matter of law in sua spome 
decreeing that the presumption of undue influence applied without reference to, or reliance upon, 
any facts establishing a nexus between any alleged trust Victoria reposed in Vernon and 
Victoria's decision to handwrite her Will in 1990. As discussed more fully below, the court's 
subsequent conclusion that Vernon actively participated and procured the Will through undue 
influence does not find support in any evidence adduced at trial. 
0. THE MAGISTRATE COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT VERNON PARTICIPATED IN THE 
PREPARATION OF THE WILL IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
The magistrate court concluded that Vernon must have participated in the preparation of 
the Will because "it makes no sense she would not have relied on him here, especially given the 
language ... Victoria H. Smith was a lifetime housewife and mother. There was no evidence she 
had any studies beyond high school. She never even learned to drive and depended on others for 
transportation. No one produced any evidence that she was sophisticated in the law." R 1516. 
Vernon briefed the lack of evidentiary support for the court's conclusions at length in his 
opening brief. Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 24-27. ln response, Joseph simply asserts without 
citation to any evidence "Mrs. Smith, who was not an attorney, used testamentary language and 
concepts which typically originate only from the mind of an attorney." R. Brief, p. 23. Joseph 
then restates the court' s conclusion that the phrases "executor without bond," "real and personal 
property," and "holographic will" have "special legal gloss. R. Brief, p. 24. There was no 
evidence, however, that Victoria lacked the capacity or intelligence to draft the Will she 
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personally penned on February 14, 1990, which Will was remarkably similar to that of her late 
husband. Joseph's bare reliance upon the court's unsupported conclusion, rather than a single 
citation to the evidentiary record, illustrates the fallacy in this argument. 
Moreover, the reliance upon post-will participation by Vernon in "testamentary" matters 
to supplant a lack of evidence upon any undue influence operating on February 14, 1990 is 
misplaced. Vernon did not deny that he drafted the 2008 POA. Victoria signed the 2008 POA. 
The 2008 POA recited that Victoria wanted Vernon to inherit her estate "because of his 
commitment, dedication, and devotion to my best interests, welfare and financial well being." 
Ex. 4, p. 2. The nearly two pages of Joseph's Brief dedicated to Vernon's alleged "abuse" of the 
2008 POA in 2012 as evidence of "disposition," and an "arrogant disregard" for Victoria's 
testamentary aspirations is not supported by a single citation to Idaho law. Similarly, the 
magistrate court's inclusion of nearly seven (7) pages expressly dedicated to this issue, an issue 
upon which summary judgment was previously granted as a matter of law, was erroneous. See 
R. 1577-1583. The 2012 Transfers also find their way into nearly every finding rendered by the 
court. The magistrate court exceeded the bounds of its discretion and Idaho law in its reliance 
upon the 2012 transfers to establish material elements of Joseph's claim of undue influence. 
E. VERNON READILY REBUTTED AT LEAST ONE ELEMENT OF A CLAIM OF UNDUE 
INFLUENCE AND THE MAGISTRATE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO HOLD JOSEPH 
TO HIS BURDEN OF PROOF TO ESTABLISH ALL FOUR ELEMENTS. 
The claim of undue influence asserted by Joseph has been an evolving target. Joseph's 
own pleadings, in fact, readily established that there was no undue influence in the making of the 
Will. R 272-274. Joseph's Petition repeatedly asserted that any alleged undue influence or 
control began twenty years before Victoria's death, or 1993. Id. at 'l(<Jl 8, 29; see also <JI 30 ("prior 
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to 1999 [Vernon] had no actual authority to act on behalf of decedent with regard to any of her 
income."). ln written discovery, Joseph was asked to identify the factual basis for his claim that 
the Will was the product of undue influence. Joseph responded: Vernon K. Smith Jr. was present 
when his mother executed the will, the will itself. There were no other witnesses of record to the 
execution of the will and that it leaves everything to only one of Victoria H. Smith's' three 
children. TT p. 154, 1. 19-p. 157, I. 13. 
At trial, however, Joseph relied upon four primary incidents which he contends support 
his claim of undue influence: (1) an issue with a well easement in April l 992 whereby Joseph 
claimed that Victoria agreed to give him an easement to her well and that she later changed her 
mind; (2) a dispute with a fence repair in 1992: (3) the Raymond foreclosure sale in June of l 990 
and finally, (4) an issue with the Hamer property in 1992. See TT p. 158, l. 3 - p. 174, I. 6. The 
magistrate court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion in adopting and exceeding 
Joseph's speculative, innuendo and hearsay laden testimony, to conclude that Vernon failed lo 
rebut even one element of a claim of a claim of undue influence. 8 
1. Victoria was not susceptible to Vernon's influence. 
As briefed in Appellant's Opening Brief, as of February 14, 1990, Victoria was not aged, 
sick, or enfeebled. She was, however, strong-willed and intelligent. Victoria relied upon many 
different people for transportation but she attended her doctor's appointments on her own; 
participated in and directed her own healthcare decisions; managed her finances; entertained and 
8 The court's rcluc1ant qualilier that "el'e11 if Vernon had rebu11ed the presumption with minimal evidence, Joseph 
directly or 1hrough Vernon's own witnesses and evidence presented a preponderance of evidence lhal Victoria's will 
... was the product of Vernon's undue influence" us a predicate to the courc"s findings docs not find support in the 
court's own decision wherein the court expressly found that Vernon failed 10 rebut each and every clement of 
Joseph's claim or undue innuence. R 1592. 
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went to mobile book libraries; continued to attend the church of her choosing until 2007; sent 
gifts and cards to family members; and, participated and engaged in the care and upkeep of her 
personal home where she chose to live alone. See e.g. TT p. 16, II. 10-13, p. 24, I. 19-p. 26, I. 12, 
p. 262, II. 8-12, p. 264, II. 1-9. Simply put, Victoria was not susceptible to influence. 
None of the nearly five pages dedicated to "susceptibility" in Joseph's Brief acknowledge 
or attempt to address the factors this Court has decreed are relevant to the susceptibility as an 
element of a claim of undue influence: 
Susceptibility, as an element of undue influence, concerns the general state of mind of 
the testator: whether he was of a character readily subject to the improper influence of 
others . . . . The court will look closely at transactions where unfair advantage appears to 
have been taken of one who is aged, sick or enfeebled. In particular, the court will 
manifest concern for a grantor who has been proven incapable of handling his or her own 
business affairs, who is illiterate, or who has undergone marked deterioration of mind and 
body shortly before the grant, or who has suffered the trauma of recent death in the 
family. 
Gmeiner, 100 Idaho at 7-8, 592 P.2d at 63-64 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added) . 
The record presented during the trial of this matter unequivocally established that 
Victoria did not possess any of the factors articulated in Gmeiner for susceptibility. Joseph's 
brief does not acknowledge these factors, let alone make any effort to apply them. The 
magistrate court committed the same error in its analysis. 
In his briefing upon the element of susceptibly, Joseph offers that Gmei11er identified 
isolation and alienation as "red flags." In material part, however, the Gmeiner Court holds that 
isolation and alienation are relevant to the fourth element of a claim for undue influence, a result 
indicating undue influence: "A property disposition which departs from the natural and expected 
is said to raise a 'red flag of warning.'" Id. at 7, 592 P.2d at 63 (citing In re Culver's Estate, 22 
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Wis.2d 665, 126 N.W.2d 536,540 (l964)). See also Section E.4. below. 
Joseph next identifies four incidents he claims are relevant to the element of 
"susceptibility." (Raymond; the fence repairs; well-easement; and Hamer). Of these incidents, 
none preceded Victoria's execution of her Will and only one, the Raymond foreclosure sale, was 
even remotely close in time. The Raymond foreclosure sale and the lack of evidence to support a 
claim of undue influence is addressed more fully in Section B. l ., above. The magistrate court's 
reliance upon the Raymond foreclosure as evidence of "susceptibility" was clearly erroneous. 
In addition to these four events, Joseph also claims that Vernon's alleged control over 
Victoria's charitable giving suggests that Victoria was susceptible to Vernon's influence. The 
sole support identified for Joseph's claim that Vernon intercepted and prevented Victoria's 
charitable aspirations was a citation to Father Faucher's inadmissible hearsay testimony. See 
also Section B.6. above. Contrary to Joseph's claim, competent and substantial evidence 
disproves the assertion that Vernon intervened in Victoria's charitable giving. Exhibits 265 
through 268 are the check registers maintained by Victoria from 1989 to 1998. They detail 
regular donations to her church, St. Mary's, as well as several other charities, such as the Special 
Olympics, the Idaho Democratic Party, the Boise Police Department, the Ada County Sheriffs 
Employees Association, the Catholic Women's League, the Professional Firefighters 
Association, Disabled American Veterans, Father Flanagan's Home for Boys, the Friends of the 
Boise Public Library, St. Labre Indian School, the Monastery of St. Gertrude, and others. 
In brief, Joseph offers conclusions, not evidence, to support his claim that Victoria was 
susceptible to Vernon's influence. Each of the examples cited occurred at least six months, if not 
years or decades, after Victoria authored her Will, and each contains an inaccurate or incomplete 
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reference to the evidentiary record and/or relies exclusively upon inadmissible hearsay. 
The magistrate court erred in its consideration of these events as evidence of 
"susceptibility" in so far as there was no evidence that Victoria was pressured, or that her will 
was ever overborne, by Vernon. This fact is readily borne out by Victoria's own words: "No one 
tells me who will inherit my property." Ex. 269 (emphasis added). The magistrate court's 
finding that Victoria was uniquely susceptible to Vernon's influence was erroneous. Vernon 
produced a quantum of evidence tending to showing that Victoria was not susceptible to any 
influence, thus shifting the burden of proof to Joseph upon his claim of undue influence. 
2. Vernon did not have an opportunity to influence Victoria in the 
drafting of her Will because it was prepared prior to Vernon's 
appearance at her home on February 14, 1990. 
Upon the element of opportunity, Joseph asserts that "Vernon's position as manager of 
his mother's financial and business affairs, together with the trust she had in him, gave Vernon 
the opportunity to influence her in the disposition of her estate." R. Brief, p. 33. As of 1990, 
however, this same argument is equally applicable to Joseph who, by his own testimony, was 
involved in Victoria's business affairs until 1992 and lived 600 feet from Victoria's home. TT. p. 
334, l. 22-p. 335, I. 3; p. 169, l. 1-p. 171, I. 5. 
3. Vernon was not disposed to unduly influence Victoria and the 
magistrate court's findings upon this element were erroneous. 
The magistrate court's conclusion that Vernon had a disposition to exert undue influence 
upon Victoria was erroneous in law and in fact. Upon the issue of disposition, the magistrate 
court relied upon a finding that Vernon (l) received substantial sums of money and asked his 
mother to purchase property as a "straw man"; (2) the "illegal" 2012 transfers; (3) his efforts to 
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isolate his mother; (4) his interactions with Father Faucher; and (5) and "other evidence." R 
1598. Vernon addressed the factual deficiencies in these findings in his Opening Brief. See 
Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 33-37. ln response, Joseph does not rebut Vernon's arguments or 
citations to evidence (or a lack thereof) but instead cites several other events he claims are 
indicative of "disposition." 
Under this element, the Court "examines the character and activities of the alleged undue 
influencer to determine whether his conduct was designed to take unfair advantage of the 
testator." Gmeiner, 100 Idaho at 8, 592 P.2d 57, 64 (1979). The Court in Gmeiner also holds: 
Another broad area of judicial concern in dealing with the element of "disposition" is the 
alleged influencer's attempts at undermining bequests to the natural heirs. The court will 
look closely at situations where the recipient of a deed or bequest has apparently been 
responsible for alienating the affections of the testator-grantor from the other members of 
his or her family. The situation is further exacerbated if the grantee has isolated the 
grantor from all contact with family or with disinterested third parties. 
Id. Upon this element, Joseph, simply repeats the magistrate court's erroneous finding that 
Vernon was active in procuring the Will. Joseph next cites to Vernon's failure to counsel his 
mother to secure estate planning advice and cites to testimony of Lyman Belnap. See Section A, 
above. Finally, Joseph cites to several post-will events that he claims are evidence of 
"disposition," namely, the 2012 Transfers, Vernon's failure to convey property back to the Estate 
in 20 J 6, and "direct evidence that Vernon overrode Mrs. Smith's charitable aspirations in 2007 
and frustrated Father Faucher's attempts to contact his mother, even for pastoral care." R. Brief, 
p. 34. The "direct" evidence Joseph identifies is actually inadmissible hearsay, together with 
Joseph's innuendo and conjecture. See also Addendum I, Items 13, 14 and 15. The only "direct" 
evidence of Victoria's intent and free-will is contained in three documents: ( 1) her Will; (2) her 
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1991 Affidavit; and (3) the 2008 POA. Additional circumstantial evidence of mother's ability to 
resist Vernon is contained in Joseph' s own letters wherein he repeatedly refers to his mother as a 
fighter, together with an acknowledgement that her choices are her own. 
The magistrate court's reliance upon isolation and alienation to support its determination 
that Vernon had a "disposition" to exert undue influence is erroneous. Upon the issue of 
isolation and alienation, there was no evidence of isolation or alienation in February 1990. 
Joseph' s own exhibits disprove the claim that Victoria was isolated. Joseph's Exhibit 2 contains 
photocopies of cards sent by Victoria to her great grandchildren and grandchildren. She sent 
cards to her great granddaughter Jessica each year from 1990 to al least 1998. The card sent in 
1998 states "call me and tell me when you can come by sometime." Ex. 2 (9-8). She also sent 
cards regularly to her grandson, Joseph Jr., and even remarked in her Christmas 2003 card 
stating, "There will be no gifts from you or me since our property taxes have raised 
exorbitantly." 
ln the March l 992 birthday party photos Victoria is seen enjoying a grandchild' s birthday 
with Joseph's family. Ex. 25 (l-A and B). Other photos simply show Victoria enjoying family 
get togethers in 1991 and 1990. Simply put, they rebut the idea Victoria was isolated in or 
around the time the will was drafted. See e.g. Ex 25(2) - 25 (78). The photos from 1989 and 
earlier show the Smith family through the years but are hardly relevant to the issues at bar. See 
e.g. Ex. 25(8) - 25(22-A). 
The lack of evidence of isolation and alienation is further borne out by the fact that 
Vernon continued to take Victoria to church regularly until 2007 and that Joseph Jr. continued to 
visit Victoria regularly until 2003, at which time Joseph Jr. discontinued his visits because 
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Victoria said she did not want to give him gifts anymore. Joseph himself continued to negotiate 
loans directly from Victoria after 1990. At least twice, Joseph requested Victoria sell or gift him 
real or personal property after 1990, in 1994 and 2001 respectively. See e.g., Ex. 234, 235, 248, 
249. Victoria responded to each request in the negative. See Id. 
The magistrate court's conclusion that Vernon failed to produce a quantum of evidence 
tending to rebut the element of "disposition" is erroneous. The magistrate court's alternative 
conclusion that Joseph sustained his burden of proof to produce a preponderance of evidence 
upon the same lacks support in the court's FFCL and the evidentiary record. 
4. The Result of Victoria's Will was consistent with a lifetime of 
disparate treatment of her children. 
The magistrate court concluded that Victoria's decision to leave her estate to Vernon was 
indicative of undue influence. Joseph simply argues, without citation to law or evidence, that "a 
will which entirely cuts out two of the decedent's three children is ·unnatural, unreasonable, and 
unjust." R. Brief, p. 35. From this argument, Joseph states .. the only reasonable explanation is 
that the Will was the product of Vernon's undue influence." This ipse dixit logic is consistent 
with the court's erroneous conclusion that Vernon failed to produce a quantum of evidence 
tending to show that the Will accurately reflected Victoria's personal desires for the disposition 
of her estate. The court's decision hinged upon a finding that there was no evidence of 
estrangement between Victoria and Joseph or Converse at the material timeframe, February 14, 
1990. This finding is erroneous in law and in fact. As this Court held in Gmeiner: 
A result is suspicious if it appears unnatural, unjust or irrational. A property disposition 
which departs from the natural and expected is said to raise a .. red flag of warning," and 
to cause the court to scrutinize the entire transaction closely. 
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On the other hand, apparently unnatural dispositions may be sufficiently explained. 
Indeed, the law must respect even an "unequal and unjust disposition" once it is 
determined that such was the intent of the grantor or testator. Thus, for example, the 
grantee may be particularly deserving by reason of long years of care and the fact that the 
grantor was motivated by affection or even gratitude does not establish undue influence. 
The fact that the grantor's natural heirs received sizable bequests will make it difficult for 
them to challenge grants to another. And the fact that the grantor was known to be 
displeased with those who were disinherited will serve to explain why they were cut off, 
whereas a sudden shift in the object of the grantor's choice coincidental with the creation 
of a confidential relation with the new beneficiary will merit strict court scrutiny. 
100 Idaho at 7, 592 P.2d at 63 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The magistrate court's 
myopic emphasis on the lack of evidence of estrangement in February, 1990, to the exclusion of 
the remainder of the Gmei11er factors, does not comport with Idaho law. Applying the above-
quoted standard, this case did not present a factual scenario whereby a testator drafted a will 
leaving her estate to her children in equal shares which will was later modified to leave the 
entirety of the estate to only one of the three children. The magistrate court's conclusion 
assumes, without evidence, that Victoria wanted her children to share equally in her estate. 
There was no evidence that Victoria treated her children equally and wanted them to share 
equally in her estate. In fact, the record was replete with evidence of disproportionate gifts and 
vastly different contributions and relationships. For example, in December 1989, Victoria gave a 
"tax-free" gift to Joseph in the amount of $9,999.00. Ex. 205. At the same time, Victoria gave 
$9,999 to Vernon and only $3,000.00 to Converse. Exs 206 and 207. There was evidence of 
repeated gifts and loans to Vernon and to Joseph in the late 1980s and continuing until the mid-
l 990s. Apart from the $3,000.00 in December 1989, there was no evidence of similar gifts or 
loans to Converse. Joseph was the only child to receive multiple gifts of real property - a home 
in 1963, followed by an acre of ground in 1975, followed by additional ground in 1986. TT. p. 
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64, I. 6 - p. 65, I. 4. 
The evidence further established that Victoria chose to leave her estate to Vernon out of 
gratitude for his efforts and contributions to her over the decades following the untimely death of 
Vernon Sr. See Ex. 204; see also TT p. 141, I. 1 - p. 144, I. 9.9 Idaho law recognizes that 
gratitude or a desire to reward Vernon's efforts does not establish undue influence and the 
court's election to ignore competent evidence explaining Victoria's decision to leave her estate 
to Vernon was erroneous. 
Joseph now asks this Court to sustain the magistrate court's findings upon a per se 
standard that lacks support in Idaho law, i.e., that it is per se unreasonable for a testator to 
disinherit their children absent proof of estrangement. This proposition is not supported by 
Idaho law; nor does it find support in the record. 
In essence, contrary to well-settled Idaho law, the court required Vernon to prove that 
Victoria disinherited Converse and Joseph out of spite in 1990. See Gmeiner, infra. Vernon 
produced more than a quantum of evidence that Victoria's intent accurately reflected her desire 
to reward his efforts; not to punish Joseph or Converse, thus shifting the burden to Joseph to 
prove each of the four elements of his claim of undue influence. '0 Applying the entirety of the 
9 The magistrate coun held that "there is no explanation for [Victoria's] decision in 1990 to disinherit her two other 
children. Vernon introduced no relevant evidence to rebut this presumption. All ol' the evidence he ci1es is very 
remole in time." R 1599. The magistrale court's finding that Vernon produced !ill re\evanl evidence is erroneous. [n 
addilion 10 the 2008 POA signed by Victoria expressing Vicloria's desire to reward Vernon for his efforts, Ms. 
Puckcll acknowledged lhat in lhc early 1990s, Victoria made her teslamcntary wishes known to Ms. Puckett and 
specified lhat she was leaving her esta1e lo "Blue" (Vernon). TI p. l 36, I. 14 - p. 138, I. 18. Victoria also provided 
her reasoning for leaving the cs1atc to Vernon. as opposed to her other children. to Ms. Puckett. TI p. 141, I. I - p. 
144,1.17. 
10 That Vic1oria's relationship with Joseph declined two years after she executed her Will is irrelevant to the 
determination ol' any facl at issue in this case. Victoria's Will was mo1iva1ed by her own wishes and gratitude. no1 
animus toward Joseph. See Ex 4. As Victoria staled in 1994. she continued to love Joseph bul did nol like his 
actions. Exhibit 235. The shift in her feelings 1oward Joseph were nol sudden or contemporaneous with her decision 
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factors set forth in Gmeiner, there was ample competent evidence that Victoria's disparate 
treatment of her children was consistent with /zer wishes and the magistrate court erred in failing 
to hold Joseph to his burden of proof to prove otherwise. 
F. THE MAGISTRATE COURT ERRED IN ITS CONSIDERATION OF EVIDENCE FAR 
REMOVED FROM THE EXECUTION OF THE WILL. 
Joseph's reliance upon the magistrate court's conclusion that hearsay evidence, though 
far removed, is admissible is, like the magistrate court's conclusion itself, erroneous. The 
magistrate court failed to apply Idaho law when it concluded, that "very remote evidence" is 
admissible and that the lapse of time is a factor in the "weight" to be given to that evidence. See 
Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho I, 9-10, 205 P.3d 650, 658-59 (2009) (holding that the 
magistrate judge exceeded its discretion in weighing inadmissible evidence and further holding 
that statements of a decedent are hearsay and are inadmissible unless "such statements relate to 
the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of his will."); see also /11 re Conway, 152 Idaho 
at 941, 277 P .3d at 388: 
All hearsay is inadmissible as evidence unless otherwise provided by Idaho rule. I.R.E. 
802. Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted." I.R.E. 80l(c). Accordingly, this Court has upheld the admission of out-of-court 
"declarations of a testator pertaining to his mental condition ... to prove his inability to 
resist the influence of others" rather than to prove the truth of those statements. King v. 
MacDonald, 90 Idaho 272, 278, 410 P.2d 969, 972 (1965). Further, "[d]eclarations not 
confined to the time of the execution of the will, including those made both before and 
after, may be received provided they are not too remote to throw light upon the mental 
condition of the testator at the time of the execution of the will." Id. at 278-79, 410 P.2d 
at 972. 
As evident from the above, the admission of statements made by the decedent are hearsay 
to leave her cs1atc 10 Vernon. She conlinued to make gifls to Joseph and to his children for years aflcr she drafted 
her Will without any involvement by or from Vernon. 
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and are inadmissible with limited exception. Joseph, nor the court, identified any controlling 
Idaho law that would support the admission of Victoria's alleged statements two, if not nearly 
twenty years, removed from the execution of her Will, upon incidents or events that have nothing 
to do with Victoria's mental condition at the time of the execution of her Will. 
G. JOSEPH'S RELIANCE UPON PUBLIC POLICY TO SUPPORT HIS ARGUMENTS IS 
UNSUPPORTED. 
Joseph's final argument rests upon a claim that public policy favoring testacy has no 
applicability in cases involving claims of undue influence. 11 Joseph' s citation to In re Corwill 's 
Estate, 86 Idaho I, 5, 383 P.2d 339 ( 1963), to support this proposition is in error. In re Corwin 
holds that the intent of the testator should control. Herein, the intent of the testator could not 
have been more clear: Victoria wanted Vernon to have her estate in its entirety. The magistrate 
court erred in its decision override Victoria's intent and invalidate her Will absent proof of undue 
influence by Vernon. 
H. JOSEPH FAILED TO REBUT THE ARGUMENT THAT THE MAGISTRATE COURT 
ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF THE 2012 
TRANSFERS. 
1. Joseph had no standing to contest the 2012 Transfers. 
In Appellant's Opening Brief, /11 re Edward J. Burke Estate, 2016 WL 4217752 at *5 
(Del.Ch., August 10, 2016), was cited in support of the proposition that Joseph did not have 
standing under l.C. § 15-12-116 to challenge the 2012 POA transfers because that statute 
permitted petitions for judicial relief to be made by interested persons only while the principal 
11 Joseph's statement "Were the Court 10 lind that either Joseph or Converse. hut nol both, was the victim of undue 
inlluence. the entire Will would have to be invalidated" is demonstrative of 1he entitlement to which Joseph clung 
through these proceedings. Joseph was nol a victim; Converse was not a victim. Although Joseph may feel an 
entitlement to Victoria' s estate ("I paid my dues to justify those thoughts") (Ex 231 ), Victoria disagreed and had 
every right to dispose of her estate in 1hc manner in which she deemed appropriate. 
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was still alive. Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 16-17. When Joseph brought his challenge on 
June I, 2016, the principal, Victoria H. Smith, had been dead for almost three years and 
therefore, by definition, she was no longer in need of the protection provided by that specific 
statute. 
Joseph has alleged in his response that the Delaware Chancery decision has been 
superseded by the decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in Matter of Estate of Burke, 170 
A.3d 778 (table), 2017 WL 3624263 (full text) (Aug. 24, 2017). The Delaware Supreme Court 
affirmed the above-cited decision of the Delaware Chancery Court by application of the doctrine 
of ademption, and in did not address the standing issue. 2017 WL 3624263 at * 1. 
Idaho Code§ 15-12-114(8) directly speaks to this question by specifically declaring that, 
"upon death of the principal" either a "personal representative" or a "successor in interest" is 
authorized to request certain disclosures from an agent under a power of attorney. It is 
undisputed that Joseph is not the personal representative of his mother's estate, leaving 
"successor in interest" as the sole possible justification for his challenge to the 2012 POA 
transfers. The phrase, "successor in interest," is not defined in the Idaho Uniform Probate Code, 
although the word "succ~ssor," is defined for purposes of that Code to mean, "those persons, 
other than creditors, who are entitled to the property of a decedent under his will or this code." 
I.C. § 15-1-20 I (50). At the time this challenge to the POA was brought in June 2016 Joseph had 
no entitlement to any of the property of Victoria H. Smith under her will, having being expressly 
disinherited by her in that will. 
In sum, and as more fully discussed in Appellant's Opening Brief pp. 15-18, Joseph 
lacked standing to challenge the 2012 POA transfers by his petition filed in June 2016. 
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Therefore, the magistrate court's order setting aside those 2012 POA transfers should be vacated. 
2. Joseph's claim is barred because he dismissed a claim based upon the 
same facts and theories. 
In his brief, Joseph misses the point. R. Brief, p.18. He dismissed a conversion claim 
against Vernon based on the same factual allegations and theories. His motion for summary 
judgment on the transfers was premised on the same facts and theories. If not barred by res 
judicata for want of a final judgment, the claim should be barred by the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel. See McAllister v. Dixon, 154 Idaho 891,894,303 P. 3d 578,581 (2013). 
3. Joseph has offered no rebuttal to the argument the 2008 power of 
attorney was coupled with an interest. 
Joseph fails to respond to the law and facts establishing that, at a minimum, Vernon had 
an equitable interest in the property of the estate as of time of the 2008 execution of the power of 
attorney by Victoria. The power was therefore "coupled with an interest," and, as a result, the 
2008 POA was exempt from the application of the provisions of the Idaho Uniform Power of 
Attorney Act. I.C. § l 5-l 2-103(a), 
The evidence in the record on this appeal establishes that in 2008 Vernon moved into the 
old farmhouse located on the Smiths' Chinden property, which he had begun remodeling in 
1989, and which has remained his primary residence since that time. R. 60, 95 ("In December, 
1989, Victoria made gifts of $9,999 to Joseph and to Vernon. Joseph kept his and Vernon 
reinvested his check into a remodel of the farmhouse - Victoria's farmstead home." R. 1388). In 
2007, the Ada County Highway District considered Vernon's legal and equitable interest in the 
Chinden real property significant enough to require him to sign a waiver of his interest at the 
time a portion of that real property was taken for the widening of Chinden Blvd. R. 748-752. 
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4. The 2012 transfers were not a gift. 
Joseph makes only the barest conclusory reference to the magistrate court's decision 
setting aside the 2012 POA transfers as based upon "gifting." R. Brief p. 19. Even assuming the 
2008 POA is governed by the UPAA, Vernon was authorized to effect the transfers by the plain 
terms of the 2008 POA. See Appellant's Opening Brief, pp. 19-20. In addition, the transfers 
were supported by consideration as explained in the undisputed evidence of Vernon's investment 
and service provided to Victoria and the property. 
5. Joseph ignores the argument that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction over 
the property and personal jurisdiction over VHS Properties, LLC. 
The magistrate lacked the authority to effectively transfer real and personal property from 
a third party, VHS Properties LLC, into the Estate. Joseph cites Pincock v. Pocatello Gold 
Mining Co., 100 Idaho 325,597 P.2d 215,217 (1979), wherein the Court discussed the authority 
of the probate court to decide property title issues "between Estate heirs." R. Brief, p. 15. The 
issue here, however, is whether the magistrate court had subject matter jurisdiction to compel a 
non-party, an Idaho legally recognized LLC, to transfer property to the Estate. Pincock holds it 
does not. Id.; see also Ruzicka v. Ru::.icka, 635 N.W.2d 528, 538 (Neb. 2011); Boldridge v. 
Keimig 's Estate, 564 P.2d 497,502 (1977) (probate court lacked jurisdiction to quiet title to real 
property; such an action should be brought in district court). See also Appellant's Opening Brief, 
pp. 13-20; Appel/am 's Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Appeal of Order Granting 
Partial Summary Judgmellt, Supreme Court Docket No. 45313-2017. 
III. CONCLUSION: 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Vernon respectfully requests this Court vacate the FFCL 
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entered by the court and remand this case with instructions to the magistrate court to enter 
judgment in Vernon's favor, dismissing the Petitions of Joseph H. Smith. In addition, Vernon 
respectfully requests this Court reverse the court's Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment 
upon the 2012 Transfers, as well as the June 2, 2017 Judgment on Motion Under Rule 70(b) of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. R 1733-1740. 
Moreover, the court erred in its prevailing party determination and in its award of 
attorney fees to Joseph on the summary judgment motion, its award of costs to Joseph upon the 
trial, and in its decision to appoint a special administrator. Vernon therefore respectfully requests 
the Court remand this case to the court to make a finding that Vernon is the prevailing party and 
is entitled to his costs below and upon this appeal. 
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ADDENDUM 1 
1. R. Brief, p. 5: Block quote of Vernon's testimony "on the circumstances 
Quote/Comment surrounding the execution of the handwritten Will on February 14, 1990." 
Citation Tr. p. 209, L. 20; Tr. p. 212, L. 5 
Context/Comment The quoted portion of those pages is accurately reflected in R. Brief, 
however, there are material omissions from the excerpt cited. Read in its 
entirety, the gap in the above-quoted portion of the transcript contains the 
following testimony: 
Q. Prior to February 14•h, 1990, had she told you she was contemplating 
making a will? 
A.No. 
Q. And prior to arriving at your mom's home on February 141\ 1990, 
did you know that she was going to name you as the sole heir of this 
will? 
A. I did not. 
Q. Did you have a discussion with her on that day about that fact? 
A. We did. I spoke to her about that and she explained to me her reasons 
why. 
Mr. Ellis: Your honor, this is - I think this is hearsay. I am not sure it is 
state of mind. 
Mr. Jones: I believe it is state of mind. And we are only asking the court 
to take it as such. 
The Court: I'm going to allow him to testify .... 
Q. By Mr. Jones: Thank you. And you started to say what she told you? 
A. I did. What she told me was the reason she was leaving it to me was 
because if but for me she would not have anything to leave for anyone. 
She wanted to show her respect and appreciation for what all I had done 
and my loyalty to her. We spoke about Vicki and, of course, there is 
very hard feelings there with Vicki. We spoke about Joe and she made 
it quite clear, as she had to be and to Joe then, before and thereafter, that 
Joseph is a taker. He is a user. She would refer to him as a thief. She had 
very strong opinions about Joseph. 
Mr. Ellis: Same objection. 
The Court: I am going to take it only for what he claims is her state of 
mind at the time. Not for the truth of the matter asserted . 
... 
2. R. Brief, p. 6: "In the presence of Mrs. Smith, Joseph refused Vernon's 
Quote/Comment request to participate as a buyer at the IRS foreclosure and auction of the 
residence which was owned by Vernon's soon to be ex-wife as her separate 
property." 
Citation in Tr. p. 236, L 9-25: 
Support: Q. By Mr. Jones: As a result of what the IRS did, did you seek the 
assistance of your brother in your mother's presence? 
A. Yes. What I did. 
Q. That is a yes or no. 
A. Then it would ,be a yes. 
Q. And did Joe agree to do what you asked him to? 
A.No. 
0. And did your mom volunteer to do that? 
A. Yes. 
0. And did she then a1212ear at the tax sale and become the owner? 
A. She did bid and became the owner. 
Q. And thus satisfying the obligation to the IRS? 
A. It did do that. 
Context/Comment The above quoted portion of the trial transcript does not support the 
reference to Vernon's ex-wife or her separate property. Additional 
discussion of the character of the Raymond Street foreclosure and 
testimony regarding the IRS audit may be found at TT. p., 229 - p. 236; 
see also p. 367, I. 14 - p. 369, l. 9. 
3. R. Brief p. 6: .. Upon Joseph's refusal, Vernon requested Mrs. Smith 
Quote/Comment participate in the auction and buy his wife ' s residence with her own money, 
which she did. Vernon testified that he engaged in this scheme to prevent 
his wife from arguing that the residence became community property upon 
sale to him. 
Citation Tr. p. 332, L. 4-9: 
The Witness (Vernon): I was going through a divorce so if I were to 
have purchased the property it would then be concluded or argued to be 
a community interest. And so I did not want to get back involved in it. I 
wanted that tax lien resolved with the money she took. 
Context/Comment No portion of the excerpt cited supports the premise that Vernon 
"requested" Mrs. Smith participate and the suggestion that Vernon 
persuaded his mother to engage in a «scheme" is unsupported by the 
evidence adduced at trial. 
4. R. Brief, p. 6-7: Vernon requested that the IRS perform a forensic audit on 
Quote/Comment his law office accounts in an attempt to persuade the Magistrate that his ex-
wife "had been stealing from him." Vernon failed to present credible 
evidence that the IRS performs forensic audits at a taxpayer's reQuest. 
Citation Tr. p., 232, L. 18-23 to p. 233 L. 1. 
Q. And you [Vernon] asked the IRS to conduct a forensic audit? 
A. I did. 
Q. And as a result the IRS prepared a tax lien? 
A. They indeed did. 
Q. And that tax lien was foreclosed against the Raymond Street 
Property? 
A. It was. 
Context/Comment There is no evidentiary support for the statements ascribed to be derived 
from the excerpt. The Transcript continues, however with the court's 
cross-examination of Vernon upon the topic of the IRS audit: 
The Court: So let me get this straight. The tax lien was - okay. Your 
testimony is the IRS just because you asked them to do a forensic 
audit came in and audited your books, correct? Yes or no? 
2 
5. 
Quote/Comment 
Citation 
Context/Comment 
6. 
Quote/Comment 
Citation 
Context/Comment 
7. 
Quote/Comment 
Citation 
The witness: I asked the IRS to come and audit the accounts, yes. 
The court: Okay. I am sorry. I am having a bit of a problem with that. 
I would like to see the request, personally. Because I have never heard 
of the IRS coming in for a private citizen and doing an IRS audit. 
The witness: Do you know Nicoli Karl? 
The court: No. And I don't want to. I don't want to get off on a 
tangent. So they did an audit of your accounts? 
The witness: Yes. 
TT. p. 233, I. 6-22. Additional discussion between the court and Vernon 
regarding the tax lien and the IRS audit continues at p. 233, I. 23 - p. 236, I. 
7. 
R. Brief, p. 7: Vernon's testimony is not credible that Joseph was aware of 
the Will's existence prior to Mrs. Smith's death. 
Tr. pp. 37, L. 24-p. 38, L. 5: 
Q. By Mr. Jones: Now, you testified in your deposition that you first 
saw your will in December, 2013? 
A. [Joseph] I believe it was the 181h of December 2013. The day after 
my mother's funeral. 
Q. And you had never seen it before that? 
A. That is correct. 
This citation of the trial record contains Joseph self-serving testimony 
which testimony was inconsistent with the letters he authored commencing 
in 1992. For additional context, the testimony continues: 
Q. Had its contents ever been disclosed to you prior to that? 
A. [Joseph] Never. 
Q. Did you ever ask your mother whether she had a will? 
A. Never. 
TT, p. 38, II. 6- 1 l. 
R. Brief, p. 7: Vernon testified that he was Mrs. Smith's attorney from the 
day he was admitted to the Bar until her death and beyond. See also R. 
Brief p. 33. 
Tr. p. 335, L. 4-10: 
Q. By Mr. Ellis: You were Mrs. Smith's attorney, correct? 
A. I was from - since I graduated and passed the Bar examination in 
1971 I was the attorney whenever she needed me 
See also TT p. 337, LL 15- 18: 
Q. [Mr. Ellis] You testified you are her attorney, right? 
A. [Vernon] In matters that she wants me to represent her in. 
This testimony did not establish that he was her attorney for all purposes or 
that she routinel y sought legal advice from him in any way. 
R. Brief, p. 8: Contains a block quote from the magistrate court's FFCL, 
together with two citations to the trial transcript to support an argument that 
the magistrate court's finding that Vernon "provided his mother legal 
advice in drafting and preparing the holographic Will." 
FF/CL, pp. 9, 10, Tr. p. 36, LL 4- 10: 
Mr. Jones: Your Honor, I offer Exhibit 200. [Vernon Sr's Will] 
3 
Mr. Ellis: No objection. 
The Court: Without objection, Exhibit 200- now, 200 does include 
other documents that are attached. Is there any objection to those other 
documents? 
Mr. Ellis: One second, Your Honor. No. 
Tr. p. 337, LL 15-18: 
Q. [Mr. Ellis] You testified you are her attorney, right? 
A. [Vernon] In matters that she wants me to represent her in. 
Context/Comment TT p. 337, continues: 
Q. So you didn't see yourself functioning as an advisor at the time you 
witnessed her sign the holographic will? 
A. No. She didn't advice for my advise (sic) in February 14, 1990. 
She asked me to witness the execution of her will. 
Q. From time to time a client doesn't ask for advise (sic) but sets out a 
proposed way to doing something. You have no responsibility to her 
to say, Mother, I think we should have a more formal will rather than 
a holographic will? That never occurred to you? 
A. I didn't say that to her and it didn't occur to me to say that to my 
mother on February 14, 1990. 
Q. Even though you see that - you agree that the holographic will was 
not the best way to do things? 
Mr. Jones. I object to the form. That assumes facts not in evidence. 
The Court: Overruled. 
The witness: No, I never said I would agree that a holographic will is 
not the best way to do things. My father did one and my mother did 
one. 
Q. By Mr. Ellis: So you disagree with that. You think holographic 
wills are preferable? 
A. I am saying if I do a will it is typically a 10-15 page document, not 
a single page document. 
Q. Why didn't you make a recommendation in this case? 
A. Because my mother didn't ask for it. She wanted to do a 
holographic will. 
TT. p.337,1.19 -p.339,l. l. 
8. R. Brief, p. 8: "Vernon testified that he did not discuss with his mother 
Quote/Comment whether to consult an estate planning professional (Tr. p. 342, L. 20-22), 
and one was not consulted. 
Citation Tr. p. 342, L. 20-22: 
Q. [Mr. Ellis] Did you ever recommend an estate planner? 
A. I did not. 
Context/Comment For additional context, the following dialogue immediately preceded the 
quoted testimony: 
Q. [Mr. Ellis] I am asking why you did not consult an estate planning 
expert given the fact that you had two estates? I am not asking about 
Judge Bieter. 
A. [Vernon] My mother owned all the property. She was the sole heir of 
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9. 
Quote/Comment 
Citation 
Context/Comment 
10. 
Quote/Comment 
Citation 
Context/Comment 
11. 
Quote/Comment 
Citation 
my father's holographic will. And she did not want any other 
involvement in any estate planning. She knew what she was going to do 
and she did what she did. 
TT. p.342,11.11-19. 
R. Brief, p. 9: "Additionally, Mrs. Smith was making Vernon's child 
support payments and paying his office expenses." 
FF/CL, p. 18; R. p. 1584, and Tr. p. 272, L 22: 
The Court: And that he couldn't pay his 
The quoted portion of the transcript actually refers to one line of 
commentary from the magistrate. The entirety of this line of testimony 
related to the admission of Exhibit 269. Exhibit 269 is the February 6, 
1991 Affidavit of Victoria H. Smith. 
R. Brief, p. 10: "There is evidence by the testimony of Mrs. Smith's 
granddaughter Kate Laxon and Father Faucher that Vernon was 
instrumental in orchestrating this estrangement [referring to estrangement 
commencing in late 1991]." 
Tr. p. 448, L. 9-13: 
A. [Kate Laxon] Conversations that I had with my grandma always were 
surrounding "I have to ask Vernon.'' "I need to check with Vernon." "I 
don't know, I will have to talk with Vernon." And Those didn't make 
sense to me. 
Tr. p. 409, L. 13-18: 
A.[Fr. Faucher] I don't remember whether it was the next weekend, but 
it was certainly within two or three weekends of that that she stopped 
coming to church. Now it was winter. It was very unusual for her not to 
come to church, she never came back after that. 
With respect to the excerpt from Ms. Laxon's testimony, the testimony 
continued: 
The Court: What was the time frame for these conversations? 
The Witness: After 1990. 
TT. p. 448, I. 16-18. 
Ms. Laxon's testimony was offered without context, over repeated 
objections for hearsay and Jack of foundation. The majority of the 
testimony from Ms. Laxon related to events in 2009. 
With respect to Fr. Faucher, the testimony continued: 
Q. So this was in 2007. Did you have occasion to see Vicki again any 
time between then and 2013? 
A. No, I never saw her. 
TT. p. 409, I. 19-22. 
R. Brief, p. 11: "Father W. Thomas Facuher was Mrs. Smith's priest for 
thirteen years and had known the Smith famil y since 1950.'' 
Tr. p. 401, L 20-23: 
Q. [Mr. Troupis] Okay. And were you - how Jong have you known the 
Smith family? 
A. Since first grade, which would be approximately 1950. 
s 
Context/Comment Fr. Faucher was not Mrs. Smith's priest for 13 years 
Q. [Mr. Troupis] And what was - when did you first become the 
pastor at St. Marys? 
A. November the 2"0, 2002 . 
... 
Q. Now going back to the period where you were the pastor in 2002 
area after that. You said that Victoria didn't drive, so do you know 
how she got to church. 
A. Her son, Vernon K. Junior, Blue, would bring her every Sunday, 
every weekend, to mass. . .. 
Q. Okay. And did she attend church from 2002, was there ever a 
period of time that she stopped attending the church? 
A. She stopped attending the church in the winter of 2007 and never 
came back again. 
TT.p,401,1.17-p. 404,l.16. 
Fr. Faucher was Victoria's priest for approximately 5 years between 2002 
and 2007, not the 13 years claimed by the Respondent, and he was not 
Victoria's priest in any timeframe germane to the execution of her Will. 
Prior to 2002, there is no evidence of a personal relationship between Fr. 
Faucher and Victoria H. Smith of any kind. 
12. R. Brief, p. 11: "Mrs. Smith responded that she would like to make such a 
Quote/Comment donation." 
Citation Tr., p. 405, L. 3-13: 
[Fr. Faucher] So when we got ready in 2007, 2006-7, we were getting 
ready to plan the renovation and expansion of St. Mary's church. I said 
to her, and I know she is being called Victoria in this proceeding, but I 
also called her Vicki. 'Vicki, would you be open to the possibility of a 
memorial gift, a rather substantial memorial gift, to the building fund as 
a memorial to your husband, Vernon K. Senior and yourself?' And she 
said "Yes, I would be very open to that. I would like that." 
Context/Comment The transcript continues: 
Mr. Jones: Your honor, I object on the basis of relevance and hearsay. 
TT, p. 405, ll. 14-15. 
A long discussion next transpires upon the admissibility of the alleged 
statements of Victoria. The magistrate court ultimately overruled the 
objection to hearsay, speculation, and relevance upon a conclusion that 
Conway and Gmeiner support introduction of evidence that "suggest they 
are isolating that person and preventing them from interacting with the 
community." TT., p. 407, I. 18 - p. 408, I. 3. 
13. R. Brief, p. 11: "Father Faucher began calling the house and was advised 
Quote/Comment that Mrs. Smith was ill but not available for him to administer the 
sacrament of the sick." 
Citation No citation is provided for this statement. 
Con lex t/Comment Upon this theme, the transcript contains the following: 
Q. Did you attempt to contact Vicki [after 2007]? 
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A. I did. After a couple of weeks, a normal thing, if somebody doesn't 
come to church you call. I called the house and somebody said, 'Well, 
she's lying down. She doesn't feel good.' And I said,' Could you have 
her call me?' 'Well, yes.' And this went on - I suppose I called every 
two or three weeks and never got anywhere. And there was always some 
reason she couldn't talk to me.' Well, I could like to come out and see 
her.' 'Well, I don't think that is a good idea,' whoever answered the 
phone would say. 
Mr. Jones: Your Honor, now we are talking about what unnamed 
people said to him on the phone. I renew my objection to the hearsay 
recitations within the witness's testimony . 
... 
The Court: I am going to overrule the objection. It is being offered for 
the effect on the listener and state of mind, not offered for the truth of 
the matter asserted. 
TT, p. 409, I. 25-p. 411, I. 6. 
The court's admission of hearsay to show the effect on the listener 
constituted a clear abuse of discretion. 
14. R. Brief, p. 11: "According to Father Faucher, Mrs. Smith 'had a deep 
Quote/Comment appreciation for strong men."' 
Citation Tr. p. 420, L. 18 top. 421, L. 2: 
A. [Fr. Faucher]Yeah. Yeah. My experience with Vicki was that she 
would be - she had a deep appreciation for strong men. And a 
strong male figure like Monsignor Kregan, or Father Riffle or Father 
Shoemaker or myself could influence her and could - she had a 
desire to please us, so if somebody asked something she would say 
yes. And that is why when I asked her for the money, I wanted to 
make sure she went back to Blue [Vernon] and made sure it was 
okay with him. 
Context/Comment As evident by the context, the statement that Victoria "had a deep 
appreciation for strong men" was followed by a list of men to whom the 
response applied: men of the cloth. Victoria was a devout Catholic. 
15. R. Brief, p. 22: "The record is replete with legal advice from Vernon to his 
Quote/Comment mother which, inter alia, adversely impacted Joseph's relationship with his 
mother: ( 1) the legal controversy surrounding the Hamer property (TR. pp. 
200-204 ); (2) the issue of the well-easement (Tr. pp. 237, 238; pp. 159-
160); (3) the dispute over the fence repairs (Tr. pp. 243,244); (4) and 
advising his mother respecting Joseph's refusal to participate in the 
foreclosure of his ex-wife's Raymond St. property (Tr. p. 164, L. 6-21; p. 
236, L. 9-25). 
Citation The citations are interlineated with the examples of "legal" advice 
provided by Respondent. 
Context/Comment With one exception for the Hamer property, the examples cited by Joseph 
of instances of "legal advice" are simply false. Upon the topic of the well 
easement, Joseph did not identify any "legal advice'' Vernon purportedly 
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gave Victoria (in April 1992). TT p. 158, l. 3 - p. 160, I. 7. Joseph's 
reliance upon the fence dispute as evidence of "legal advice" in late 1991 is 
also misplaced. The fence dispute involves a fence repair done in 1992 by 
a third-party that Joseph found to "be close to satisfactory" and that he told 
Victoria that although the repairs are not "first class, they will work" and 
"let's accept it." TT. p. 160, I. 8 - p 162, I. 2. Joseph claims Victoria 
agreed with Joseph's plan and subsequently changed her mind after talking 
to Vernon and directed Joseph to reject the work. Joseph claims he refused, 
at which point Victoria "fired" him. Id. Joseph also relies upon the 
Raymond foreclosure as evidence of "advice" Vernon provided to Victoria. 
Upon the record submitted herein, it is incredible to suggest that Vernon 
was providing "legal advice" to his mother when he asked Joseph to buy a 
house, he refused, and Victoria volunteered. TT p. 236, L 9-25. 
As to the Hamer property, the testimony was undisputed that Joseph and 
Victoria were sued in July 1992; Joseph wanted to settle the claim; Vernon 
disagreed and agreed to fight the matter with government; Joseph thus 
demanded indemnity for his role in the property from Victoria and Victoria 
executed an indemnity agreement in Joseph's favor. TT p. 85, 1. 6- 16; p. 
103, I. 10- p, I05, I. 23; Ex. 222. 
16. R. Brief, p. 22-23: "In contrast [to Swaringen], as testified by Father 
Quote/Comment Faucher, Mrs. Smith "had a deep appreciation for strong men" and "had a 
desire to please" such figures. Tr. p. 420, L. 18 to p. 421, L. 2. 
Citation Tr. p. 420, L. 18 to p. 42 t, L. 2. (quoted above) 
Context/Comment As noted above, Fr. Faucher's testimony related to his perception of 
Victoria's appreciation for strong church figures in or around 2002-2007. 
In no way did Fr. Faucher testify that in 1990, Victoria was susceptible to 
influence by Vemon. 
17. R. Brief, p. 27: Contains a block quote of testimony offered by Lyman 
Quote/Comment Belnap to support the proposition that .. [t]he legislated emergence of the 
holographic will, recognized in most jurisdictions, was not intended to 
promote a do-it-yourself trend in will drafting. Rather, it was intended to 
provide individuals with a testamentary option where a terminal illness or 
exigent circumstances prevented access to counsel and the drafting of a 
conventional, printed will. As testified by Lyman Belnap ... :" 
Citation TR., p. 221, L. 5-15: 
A. The instances when I have been able to have input on holographic 
wills it's usually been a situation where people were leaving town and 
no time to sit down and do a formal will. Something in the interim to 
carry them until they could get back to town so they didn't have 
absolutely nothing as they traveled. 
Context/Comment The quote actually continues: 
And I think that's probably the only time I have recommended them 
even though I have ex12lained to geogle that the:i are normall:i a valid 
instrument and recognized by the Court. 
TT. p. 221, L 11 - 15. 
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Mr. Belnap offered no testimony as to any standard of care for attorneys in 
general or the intent of the legislature in passing Idaho Code § 15-2-503. 
His testimony lacked context and was offered in a vacuum because, as he 
conceded, Mr. Belnap was unaware of the facts of this case. TT. p 224, I. 
19- p. 225, I. 8. 
18. R. Brief, p. 34: "direct evidence that Vernon overrode Mrs. Smith's 
Quote/Comment charitable aspirations in 2007 and frustrated Father Faucher's attempts to 
contact his mother, even for pastoral care." 
Citation Tr. p. 414, L. IO top. 415, L. 16: 
Q. By Mr. Troupis: Now, you were - how close were you with Vicki, 
would you say? 
Mr. Jones: In what time frame? 
Mr. Troupis: In 2002 to 2007 
The Witnesses [Father Faucher]: She was an elderly parishioner, but 
more than that, she had been a very close friend of my mother's. So 
she had I guess a special place in my heart. And I was close to her. 
She was very pleased that I was the pastor and she felt a certain 
warmth and depth towards me. 
Q. By Mr. Troupis: So how important is it for a devout Catholic to 
receive the sacraments of the sick before they pass away? 
A. Oh, extremely important? 
Q. Is that part - the church teaches that? 
A. The church teaches that. 
Mr. Jones: Objection. Relevance. 
The Court: Overruled. 
The Witness: The church teaches that, yes . 
... 
Mr. Troupis: Were you ever called by Vernon K. Smith to anoint - to 
go out and see his mother and give her the sacrament of the sick? 
A.No. 
Context/Comment There was no "direct" (or even circumstantial) evidence that Vernon 
overrode Mrs. Smith's charitable aspirations; nor was there any evidence 
that he "frustrated Father Faucher's attempts to contact his mother, even for 
pastoral care." 
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